TITLE
"Conditions for Captive Insurer Value: A Monte Carlo Simulation," Nicos A. Scordis, James Barrese, and Masakazu Yokoyama, Fall 2007, Volume 30, No. 2, pp 79-101. Full-text articles soon will be available through ABI/INFORM and EBSCO; click here for article PDF

ABSTRACT
Concentration in the U.S. insurance industry’s market shares and ownership,
coupled with a network interlocking ownership relationships by institutional investors,
raise social concerns. Studying the relationship between Tobin’s q and corporate
governance features of the industry, we fail to find support for the incentive alignment
or entrenchment hypotheses, but our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that
controlling owners may couple with others to expropriate private value from minority
shareholders. An interesting observation from the study is the degree to which family
control is prevalent in the industry; combining family control and institutional ownership
makes most stock insurers closely held.