TITLE
"Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection, and Tort Liability," Journal of Insurance Issues, James R. Garven, Spring 2005, Vol. 28, No. 1, pp. 1-13. Full-text articles soon will be available through ABI/INFORM and EBSCO; click here for article PDF. 

ABSTRACT
This article analyzes how moral hazard and adverse selection problems that arise from the imposition of strict liabiity in the area of products liability law affect consumer welfare in products markets. The article concludes with a brief overview of some important contributing factors behind the expansion of the U.S. tort system, and analyzes the economics of a popular tort reform proposal known as the "Loser Pays" rule. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: K13, D82.  

[Keywords: moral hazard, adverse selection, tort liability, tort reform]